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I.

INTRODUCTION

The inherent purpose behind Florida's constitutional protection of
a debtor's homestead from forced sale and the restriction against alienation and devise has been to protect the family and its shelter.' This
has been true for more than 100 years. During that time, however,

* Professor of Law, Nova University, Center for the Study of Law. A.B., 1973, University
of Miami; J.D., 1976, University of Florida. Professor Seiden co-authored Maines & Maines,
Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 227
(1978).
1. Wakeman v. Noble, 73 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1954) (en banc) ('The purpose of homestead
provisions is simply to shelter the family that lives, or survives.").
The homestead tax exemption is beyond the scope of this article. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §
6 (1968). Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the 1968 Florida Constitution, as amended.
919
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society and logistics have changed. Divorces, second and third marriages, children from different marriages, and litigation are more prevalent. In 1984, Florida's homestead exemption was liberalized to extend its availability to any natural person, regardless of whether that
person was the head of a family. 2 In part, this liberalization reflects
the changes in families and in roles within the family. In view of these
changes in law and society, the homestead provisions and the relevance
of the concept of the family need to be revisited.
The homestead is not always owned by one person in fee simple
absolute or by a married couple as a tenancy by the entirety. Instead,
ownership interests include joint tenancies with rights of survivorships, tenancies in common, and life estates and remainder interests.
Therefore, the effect of these various forms of ownership also needs
to be analyzed in light of the revised homestead laws.
First, this article will summarize the elements of a homestead and
the ramifications of homestead status.3 Next, the article will consider
the concept of the family and its relevance to the homestead exemption
and restrictions. Then, the article will discuss the various forms of
homestead ownership that exist by choice, statute, or decree, and the
effects of co-ownership. Last, the need for constitutional or statutory
reform will be considered.
The Florida Constitution does not per se define the term "homestead"; however, it provides various limitations and requirements.Among these are an acreage limitation, an ownership requirement,
and a residency requirement. The acreage limitation is that a homestead is limited to one-half an acre when located inside a municipality,
and 160 acres when located outside a municipality. The homestead
consists of the home, which includes real property and improvements,
and any contiguous land within those limitations. The ownership requirement is that real property must be owned by a natural person,
as opposed to, for example, a corporation, in order to qualify as homestead.5 The residency requirement is that the homestead exemption

2. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. For discussions regarding the amendment when it was proposed,
see Berman, PRO Article X, § 4 Arguments for the Revision of Homestead Exemption, 52
FLA. B.J. 651 (1978); McDonald, CON Article X, § 4 Some Questions on the Homestead Revisions, 52 FLA. B.J. 654 (1978); Wall, Homestead and the Process of History: The Proposed
Changes in Article X, Section 4, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 877 (1978).
3. For a discussion of the origin of Florida's homestead law, see Crosby & Miller, Our
Legal Chameleon, The FloridaHomestead Exemption I-V, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 13 (1949).
4. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; see Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 823, 836 (1882).
5. An equitable interest may qualify as homestead. Heiman v. Capital Bank, 438 So. 2d
932 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983). Further, a homestead may maintain its qualified status even though
a contract for sale has been executed and even though the real property interest otherwise
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is limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family; although,
the exemption may include land contiguous to the residence.
There are several consequences when property qualifies as homestead. First, one's homestead cannot be subject to forced sale nor can
any liens attach, except for liens for certain debts and taxes. 6 Exceptions include tax liens and liens for the purchase or improvement of
the homestead, all of which can attach to homestead property.7 Second,
if the owner is married, the owner cannot give, sell, mortgage, or
otherwise alienate the homestead during his or her lifetime, without
his or her spouse's joinder or consent.:
Third, if the owner is survived by a spouse or any minor children,
there are restrictions on the owner's right to devise the homestead. 9
Further, if the homestead may not be devised, or if it can be devised
but it is not devised properly, then there are legislative provisions
for descent of the homestead. 10 The following is a summary of these
rules. If the owner is survived by a spouse and a minor child, then
the owner cannot devise the homestead and the surviving spouse will
receive a life estate with the decedent's lineal descendants (including
his or her minor child) receiving a vested remainder. If instead, the

might be converted into personalty pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion. Brown v.
Lewis, 520 F. Supp. 1114 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (homestead was not abandoned when owners left
prior to sale but after sales contract was executed); In re Estate of Skuro, 487 So. 2d 1065
(Fla. 1986).
After a sale has been consummated, the proceeds from the sale of the homestead may be
exempt if, prior to and at the time of the sale, there is a good faith intent to reinvest the
proceeds in a new homestead within a reasonable time. McGuire v. Manufacturers & Traders
Trust Co., 37 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (proceeds not exempt because of lack of
intent to reinvest); Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croiz, 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla.
1962). For a discussion of these proceeds cases, see Note, FloridaHomestead Exemption Proceeds From the Voluntary Sale of a Homestead - A Shield or a Trap for the Debtor?, 12
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 923 (1985); Note, Exempt Status of Proceeds From Conversions of the
Homestead, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 410 (1962); Note, The Exemption of Proceedsfrom a Voluntary
Sale of Homestead Property, 17 U. MLMI L. REV. 99 (1962).
6. There should not be an exception for a judgment against an owner for child support.
Thus, a child support judgment should not create a lien against homestead. See Graham v.
Azar, 204 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1967) (the $1,000 personal property exemption was involved). But
see Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1950) (the court stated in dictum, 'the
defendant was not the head of a family, and even if he had been such, his interest in the
homestead would still have been subject to sale for the purpose of providing support money for
his children.").
7. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. At least one court also has held that one's homestead may be
forfeited under the RICO statute. DeRuyter v. State, 521 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988).
8. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
9. Id.
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401, .4015 (1987).
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owner is survived by a spouse and adult children or only a spouse,
then the owner can devise the homestead to his or her spouse. The
owner must devise all, but not less than all, of the homestead to the
surviving spouse, outright and in fee simple;" otherwise, the spouse
will receive a life estate with the lineal descendants receiving a vested
remainder. Alternatively, if the owner is survived by neither a spouse
nor a minor child, then the owner can devise the property to whomever
he or she chooses; otherwise, it will pass by intestacy.Y Thus, the
owner's surviving spouse, lineal descendants, devisees, or intestate
13
heirs will receive the homestead.
Fourth, on the death of the homestead owner, the exemption from
forced sale by creditors of the deceased owner inures to the benefit
of the decedent's surviving spouse or heirs.14 This is significant if the
homestead passes to the same persons to whom the exemption inures.
If the homestead passes to the decedent's surviving spouse or heirs,
then those persons will be able to assert the exemption. Thus, the
homestead property that was not subject to the decedent's creditors
when the decedent was alive cannot be used to satisfy those creditors
when the owner is dead. If the homestead does not pass to the surviving spouse or heirs, then the exemption will not inure to the new
owners; instead, the personal representative may use the homestead
to satisfy creditors.15
Thus, Florida's homestead provisions provide a debtor with a shield
from creditors during lifetime as well as on death. This is true for a
debtor with a modest homestead as well as for a debtor with a multimillion dollar one. Further, the homestead provisions protect certain
family members by restricting the owner's right to transfer or devise
his or her homestead as he or she pleases, with these restrictions
applying to a nondebtor owner as well as a debtor owner.

11. In re Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981) (devise of a life estate in homestead
to surviving spouse with a vested remainder to one of decedent's daughters was an invalid
devise because all of homestead was not devised to the surviving spouse). Similarly, devise of
an undivided one-half interest to the surviving spouse and one-half to an adult child, as tenants
in common, would be invalid. In re Estate of Cleeves, 509 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987);
Iandoli v. Iandoli, 504 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987). If there are no minor children, then
the devise to the surviving spouse may be a specific devise or it may be a residuary devise.
In re Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.103, .401 (1987).
13. In addition, the new owner may qualify for an exemption from the new owner's creditors
under FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4, if the new owner or his or her family resides there.
14. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b).

15. See FLA. STAT. § 733.806 (1987) (regarding abatement); id. § 733.813 (regarding tax
apportionment).
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II.

THE CONCEPT OF THE FAMILY AND ITS RELEVANCE

Prior to the 1984 constitutional amendment, the concept of family
was an integral part of the homestead provisions. The question now
is whether the concept of family still is an integral part of the homestead provisions. To answer this, to the extent there is an answer,
one needs first to review how the concept of the family was tied to
the homestead provisions and then discuss whether these ties still
apply.
Prior to the 1984 amendment, family was an integral part of the
exemption because the homestead exemption was available only to
the head of a family who resided on the property or whose family
resided there. 16 The purpose of the homestead exemption was to protect the family by providing them with shelter even at the expense
of most creditors. The constitution not only protected the homestead
from the reach of creditors but it also protected the family from certain
actions of the family head. Thus, under certain circumstances, the
constitution prohibited the head of a family from alienating the homestead during his or her lifetime and from devising it on death. 17 The
legislature further protected the family by proscribing to whom the
homestead would descend when the head of a family was prohibited
from devising it or failed properly to devise it.,,
The method by which the constitution protected the family from
inter vivos alienation was by requiring joinder of the spouse, if there
was one. 19 The method by which the constitution protected the family
on death of the family head was to prohibit devise if the head of a
family were survived by a spouse or minor child. 20 This scheme of
protection contained some gaps. For example, the spouse could consent
to an inter vivos gift or alienation to the detriment of minor children
or other family members,21 and the lineal descendants of the head of
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1968).
17. Id. § 4(c).
18. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1983).
19. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
20. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1983).
21. A lineal descendant does not have an interest in the homestead during the owner's
lifetime and cannot prevent the owner from alienating it if allowed by the constitution. Further,
a lineal descendant will not necessarily receive an interest in the homestead when the owner
dies. Prior to the constitutional amendment allowing an owner to transfer title to the homestead
to a tenancy by the entirety with his or her spouse, however, there was case law alluding to
the lineal descendants having an interest in the homestead during the owner's lifetime. For a
discussion of this issue and related cases, see Buchwald, Florida Homestead: A Restraint on
Alienation by Judicial Accretion, 19 U. MIAIuI L. REv. 114, 121-34 (1964); Note, Our Legal
Chameleon is a Sacred Cow: Alienation of Homestead Under the 1968 Constitution,24 U. FLA.
L. REV. 701, 708-09 (1972).
16.
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a family could inherit interests in the homestead even if they were
not minors or members of the "family" of which the decedent was the
head. Nevertheless, the overall scheme of protection of the family
prevailed. Further, because the homestead was not subject to forced
sale to pay debts of the head of a family during his or her lifetime,
the constitution protected the homestead at the death of the family
head from the reach of those creditors by providing that the exemption
would inure to the surviving spouse and heirs.2 Thus, if the homestead
were devised or descended to the decedent's surviving spouse or lineal
descendants or other heirs, then the exemption also would inure to
their benefit. In other cases where the family head was free to devise
the homestead, adult children were not necessarily protected nor did
the exemption necessarily inure to the devisees of the homestead.
Thus, the prohibition against devise, the inurement of the exemption,
and the legislative provisions for descent protected the family when
the family included a spouse or minor child.
In addition, the constitution protected the nontraditional family,
such as a family in fact arising out of communal living by two persons
where the owner was regarded as in charge, by protecting the homestead from the reach of the family head's creditors. 23 The family in
fact, however, was not necessarily protected from alienation or devise
by the family head nor from the reach of the owner's creditors on the
owner's death.
The ownership requirement in the constitution has been expanded
so that it is available to any natural person who owns a homestead
and who resides on the property or whose family resides thereon.
Now the concept of family is no longer a prerequisite to the availability
of the homestead exemption.'instead, the exemption is available to a
spouse who is not the head of a family, to a married individual who
is separated or awaiting a divorce, and even to an unmarried individual
who lives alone. This raises questions as to the meaning of the family
with respect to the residency requirement, which limits the exemption
to the residence of the owner or his or her family, and with respect
to whether the restriction against devise, which applies when the
owner is survived by either spouse or minor child, can be waived.
Further, it raises the question of whether the protection of the family
previously granted to the family via the constitutional prohibition
against devise and the inurement of the exemption does or should
remain. The major issues involve (1) who constitutes the owner's family
for purposes of the residency requirement, (2) whether an owner can

22. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b) (1968).
23. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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have more than one homestead, (3) whether an owner has the right
to devise the homestead if the owner's spouse abandons the owner or
waives or otherwise loses his or her right to receive an interest in
the homestead,2 4 and (4) who is an heir for purposes of the inurement
of the exemption.
For purposes of the residency requirement, if the owner resides
on the property, it is irrelevant if a family member or another person
also resides on the property. The owner can reside on the property
alone and qualify for the homestead exemption. Thus, for purposes of
qualifying for the exemption from creditors, the concept of family is
irrelevant to the resident owner. If the owner does not reside on the
homestead, then the concept of family is relevant. In fact, then the
residency of the owner's family is a prerequisite to the exemption.
For purposes of determining whether there are restrictions on
alienation or devise, the concept of the family still is relevant for the
resident owner and also for the nonresident owner whose family satisfies the residency requirement. The restrictions on alienation and devise will apply to the owner only if his or her family includes certain
family members, specifically a spouse2 when inter vivos alienation is
involved, or a surviving spouse 2 6 or minor child when devise is involved. In addition, if no devise is allowed or properly made, then
the existence of a surviving spouse or lineal descendants, or in their
absence, the existence of other classes of intestate heirs, is relevant
to determine to whom the homestead descends. Further, the existence
of a surviving spouse or heirs is relevant at the owner's death for
purposes of determining to whom the exemption inures.
A.

The Residency Requirement

To the extent the concept of the family is relevant to the residency
requirement, the issue is who constitutes the owner's family? This is

24. This issue was not created because of the constitutional amendment; it existed when
the head of a family requirement was in effect. It still exists and needs to be resolved.
25. If the spouse has waived all rights to the homestead pursuant to a valid antenuptial
agreement, spousal consent still should be required for a conveyance. If, for example, a spouse
has agreed in writing to consent to any inter vivos alienation, questions may arise as to the
validity of the agreement and whether it has been revoked. See Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment,
Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985); see also Van Pelt v.
Estate of Clarke, 476 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (lineal descendants did not waive right
to homestead by quitclaim deed executed before parent's death).
26. For a discussion of whether the restriction on devise applies if a decedent has a surviving
spouse who has waived, disclaimed, or otherwise lost the right to an interest in the homestead,
see hnfa text accompanying notes 56-58.
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not a new issue, but under prior law the issue was inextricably tied
to discussions of family headship when either the owner or his or her
family in law or in fact resided there.
To determine the meaning of the term family, one needs to examine
the law prior to the 1984 constitutional amendment. At that time the
owner needed to be the head of a family rather than just a natural
person; however, the residency requirement was the same in that the
exemption was limited to the residence of the owner or his or her
family. For purposes of determining whether the owner was the head
of a family, a test evolved that established the existence of a person
who was the head of a family in law or a family in fact. The person
who was the head of a family in law had "a legal duty to support
which ... [arose] out of a family relationship"; whereas, the head of
a family in fact arose out of "continuing communal living by at least
two individuals under such circumstances that one is regarded as in
charge."' Whether a person was the head of a family was a factual
issue.
In reviewing head of family cases, it is very difficult to separate
what language of the cases is outdated because it is relevant only to
the family headship requirement and what language, if any, is relevant
to define family for purposes of residency. For example, one exemption
case held that a father who was legally obligated to support a child
born out of wedlock was not the head of a family in law because the
duty to support did not arise "out of a family relationship" in that the
father had not "manifested substantial concern for the welfare of his

27. Holden v. Estate of Gardner, 420 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 1982). For head of family in
fact cases, see Beck v. Wylie, 60 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1952) (mother was head of family, consisting
of the mother and an adult daughter, absent finding of abandonment by daughter); Davis v.
Miami Beach Bank & Trust, 99 Fla. 1282, 128 So. 817 (1930) (mother was head of family,

consisting of 71-year-old mother and incapacitated adult son cared for by mother, with other
sons contributing support); Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917) (son was
head of family, consisting of son, mother, and minor children of a deceased sister; on son's
death, son's mother was head of family, consisting of son's mother and the minor children of
deceased daughter); In re Estate of Pendrys, 443 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984) (mother
was head of family in fact, consisting of mother and her son, even though father of son, by
agreement, was required to furnish son's full support and maintenance); In re Estate of Wilder,
240 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970) (grandmother was not head of family in fact, consisting
of grandmother, her grandson, his wife and his child; instead, grandson was head of family,
consisting of grandson, his wife and his child); Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1962) (mother was head of family consisting of mother and her son, who was also
supported by his father); see also Killian v. Lawson, 387 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1980) (divorced husband
was considered head of family under FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1975), which exempts from garnishment the wages of the head of a family, because he provided former wife with alimony, which

was her sole means of support).
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child." ; 3 Nor was he the head of a family in fact because the father
lived alone and thus did not "satisfy the 'continued communal living'
requirement. "9

From the opinion in that case, it is difficult to determine whether
the mere legal relationship of father and minor child is sufficient to
create a family in law, with a manifestation of substantial concern
being necessary for family headship, or whether a manifestation of
substantial concern is a prerequisite to the family relationship.
Further, other cases reflect that a family consisting of a parent and
adult child whom the parent was not legally obligated to support was
not considered a family in law but instead was considered under the
family in fact test.
Now that the family headship requirement has been eliminated,
who qualifies as the owner's family for purposes of the residency
requirement? One may use a number of different definitions. These
include the following: (1) an immediate family definition, (2) an heir-atlaw or intestacy definition, (3) a family in law definition, or (4) a
revised family in law/family in fact definition.
The first alternative, an immediate family definition, would include
only members of the owner's immediate family. Thus, only the owner's
spouse or child, whether adopted or born within or out of wedlock,
would qualify as members of the owner's family.
The second alternative, an intestacy family test, would define an
owner's family as those relatives listed in Florida's intestacy statutes.
An owner's immediate family, plus other descendants, such as grandchildren, ascendants, such as grandparents, and collaterals, such as
brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, aunts, and uncles, would qualify
as members of the owner's family. 30 A strict intestacy test, however,
would include a relative only if that relative would inherit if the decedent died intestate. Under such a strict test, an owner's parents would
be heirs only if the owner had no spouse or lineal descendants.
The third alternative, a family in law definition, would be the
definition used under the predecessor homestead law test. Under this
test, an owner's family would include only those persons whom the
owner is legally obligated to support, 31 and the owner's spouse.3 2 Under
28. Flannery v. Green, 482 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
29. Id. at 403.
30. FLA. STAT. § 732.103 (1987).
31. If a parent has the legal obligation to support a minor child, then that parent can be
considered the head of a family even if the child does not reside with that parent; however, if
the child does not reside with the parent and the parent does not support the child, then whether
the parent will be the head of a family depends in part on why the property is being claimed
as homestead.
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this strict family in law definition, an adult child whom the owner is
not obligated to support would not qualify as a member of the owner's
family.
The fourth alternative, a revised family in law/family in fact definition, would define the owner's family as those persons whom the
owner is legally obligated to support or whom the owner actually
supports plus the owner's spouse. Under the revised family in law/family in fact definition, continued communal living with the owner would
not be required and the definition would be relevant only when the
owner did not reside in the home. Under that test, if the owner's
former spouse and adult child whom the owner was not obligated to
support resided on the property, then the property would not qualify
as the owner's homestead unless the owner actually supported the
adult child. 3 If this latter definition is chosen, then the courts will
have to define what constitutes support and whether the owner must
provide all of that person's support, or whether providing the residency
of the homestead is sufficient.
The question of which definition of family is appropriate for purposes of the residency requirement is a difficult one to answer. This
is because an unmarried individual who owns a home and lives there

A few exemption cases include: In re Jones, 12 Bankr. 878 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (debtorfather was not head of family even though, he was legally obligated to support minor child who

lived with mother because the only support he provided was indirectly in the form of monthly
Social Security payments, of approximately $200 each, made to the mother for the child's
support); Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1950) (father was not the head of a family
because he failed to provide support and sought the homestead exemption in order to prevent
a judgment for failure to pay child support from becoming a lien on his home); Osceola Fertilizer
Co. v. Sauls, 98 Fla. 339, 123 So. 780 (1929) (father was head of a family when he was liable
for support of minor child and actually supported child).
A few devise or descent cases include: Brodgon v. McBride, 75 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1954) (devise
to surviving spouse void when husband was legally obligated to support and did support his
minor daughter who lived with her mother); Routman v. Desvarieux, 467 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1985) (home passed to father's minor children, when father was legally obligated to
support, and actually provided support, to minor children who lived with former wife); Estate
of Deem v. Shinn, 297 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974) (devise of homestead invalid when
father was legally obligated to support minor daughter who lived with mother, notwithstanding
that father never provided support).
32. If there are no children, there is a question under the head of family cases as to whether
-residency by the nonowner-spouse is a prerequisite for homestead status. See Van Meter v.
Van Meter, 214 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968) (devise valid because husband and wife had
been separated for over 11 years and did not live together as a family, notwithstanding that
husband supported wife until his death). For a discussion of spousal abandonment, see infra
text accompanying notes 46-54.
33. A person's family may include a former spouse supported by that person, such as by
alimony payment. See Killian v. Lawson, 387 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1980); see also supra note 27.
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alone is entitled to the homestead exemption. The question then is
whether a divorced individual who lives in a rented apartment and
who owns a home in which his or her former spouse and adult child
live should be entitled to the benefit of the homestead exemption for
that home. It would appear that this person should be entitled to the
exemption even if the owner has no legal obligation to support the
adult child. But what about a married person who owns and lives in
a cooperative"I and who owns a home in which his or her elderly
parents live? Should that person be entitled to the homestead exemption? It would appear that this person should be entitled to the exemption as the owner of the home in which his or her parents reside. But
then what about the person who owns one home in which his or her
former spouse lives with minor children from the first marriage and
who owns another home in which he or she lives with a second spouse
and minor children from that marriage? If that person has creditors,
should both homes be exempt or should the creditors be able to reach
the house in which the debtor resides or the one in which the debtor's
children from the first marriage reside? If only one is exempt, which
family should be protected? This is a much harder question to answer.3
It is even harder if the judgment is for unpaid support for the children
of the first marriage.
The issue of whether the residence of the owner's family is homestead is further complicated when the issue is raised in the context
of an inter vivos alienation or devise rather than in the exemption
context. For example, if the married person described above who lived
in the cooperative devised the home occupied by his or her parents
to them and that home were homestead, then the devise would be
invalid because the owner was survived by a spouse. Thus, if the
home qualified as homestead, then that property would descend to
the surviving spouse. It is quite conceivable that a court could find
the home to be a homestead if the exemption issue were raised but
not if the devise issue were raised. The problem, however, is that
the answer should be the same regardless of whether the context
involves an exemption or a devise.3
Although it will be the court's role to determine the proper definition of family for the residency requirement, the definition should

34. A cooperative cannot qualify as homestead under FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 because it
is personal property rather than real property.
35. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing whether an owner can have
more than one homestead).
36. See Holden v. Estate of Garner, 420 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982).
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reflect not only that the homestead law be construed in favor of those
persons for whom it was designed to protect but also to reflect the
liberalization of its availability to all natural persons. The probable
result will be the fourth alternative, that of a revised family in law/family in fact test. This is because some nexus should be required between
the owner and resident family members other than a mere family
relationship. For example, a parent who rents a home to a child should
not be able to claim that home as his or her homestead. Further,
some minimum level of support should be required, which will exist
if the owner is providing a family member or members with a place
to live; however, the fact that the family member or members also
contribute to some of the expenses of living in the house should not
preclude homestead status. Under this revised family in law/family in
fact test, cases will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Such a test
would by no means be perfect. Just as under prior tests, inconsistencies
among cases could arise depending on whether the case involved the
exemption or an alienation or devise and descent issue. Nevertheless,
the revised family in law/family in fact test seems the most logical
and appropriate because it begins with prior case law and then is
revised to reflect the constitutional deletion of the family headship
requirement.
B.

Multiple Homesteads by Same Owner

A collateral issue is whether a person who owns two homes, one
of which is his or her residence and one of which is his or her family's
residence, can have more than one homestead. If the answer is no,
then the next issue is which one will be his or her homestead. Many
believe that a person can have but one homestead. 37 Under prior law,
courts discussed the problem of dual homesteads but in a different
context. In that context, the concern was that a family could not have
two heads; thus, the same family could not have two homesteads
owned by two different family heads.3 The issue of whether one person
could have two or more homesteads was not raised; 39 however, the
issue could have been raised under the prior constitutional language.

37. Inre Estate of Boyd, 519 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1988) (Walden, J., dissenting).
38. In re Estate of Pendrys, 443 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984).
39. One bankruptcy court, however, stated that when the debtor lived with her husband
and her children from previous marriages, there could not be "two households within one family
unit, that is, there cannot be one household consisting of debtor and her two children, and
another consisting of debtor and her husband." In re Smith, 30 Bankr. 78, 79 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1983).
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The constitution states that "[t]here shall be exempt . . . the
following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead ...
limited to the residence of the owner or his family. ' 40 Does the reference to "a" homestead and "the owner or his family" mean that a
natural person can have but one homestead? Or are the underlying
purposes of the exemption and the restrictions to protect the owner's
residence and his or her family's residence, and if they are different,
to protect, exempt, and restrict both?
If the constitution is construed so that a person is limited to one
homestead, but the person owns more than one home, then which
home will qualify as homestead for exemption purposes and for devise
and descent purposes? A convenient rule would be to treat the owner's
residence as homestead, but if the owner did not own and reside on
real property in Florida, then his or her family's residence would
qualify. In the rare case where one person owns two residences in
Florida, yet resides in neither, and different family members reside
in each, a judicial determination of homestead would be required. A
second alternative would be to give the owner the opportunity during
lifetime or by will to designate which home qualifies as homestead. If
the owner failed to designate, then the first rule described above
would apply. A third alternative would be to require a judicial determination of homestead, on a case-by-case basis, where more than one
home is at issue. Under this latter rule, the legislature might provide
guidance for which home should be granted preference as homestead.
Under any of these rules, anomalous results can occur. For example, assume that a man owns one home and resides there with his
second wife. He owns a second home as a tenant in common with his
former wife who resides there with his minor children. If the owner's
residence is his homestead, then his creditors cannot reach his residence. His creditors, however, will be able to reach his undivided
41
one-half interest in the home of his former wife and minor children.
Further, he would be prohibited from devising his residence and on
his death, his second wife would receive a life estate in their residence
and his minor children and other lineal descendants would receive a
vested remainder. In addition, he would be free to devise his tenancy
in common interest to his second wife, children, or any other person.
By contrast, if the tenancy in common home were his homestead, that
interest would be exempt from creditors but his creditors could reach

40. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (emphasis added).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 69-77 (regarding property owned as a tenancy in
common).
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his residence. In addition, he would be free to devise his residence
to anyone, and his second wife would receive a life estate in his one-half
interest in his former wife's residence, with his lineal descendants
receiving a vested remainder in that one-half.
If the constitution is construed so that an owner can have more
than one homestead, the owner and his or her family would receive
additional protection from creditors by exempting more than one residence. Further, a spouse might receive two life estates and descendants might receive remainders in two residences.
There is no perfect solution. However, the most probable result
is that the courts will balance the rights of the debtor and the rights
of his or her creditors and prevent an owner from sheltering more
than one residence. This is most probable notwithstanding that the
prohibition against devise and statutory rules for descent are designed
to protect the family and yet may not apply to the family's residence
if that residence is not accorded homestead status. Further, some of
the devise and descent problems can be avoided by planning. For
example, the husband and second wife could own their home as tenants
by the entirety and thus prevent the lineal descendants from the first
marriage from receiving a remainder interest. In addition, the former
spouse, as a culmination of the divorce, could have protected herself
and her children by receiving either outright ownership of her home
or the exclusive right of possession for herself and her minor children.
If an owner can have but one homestead, then granting preference
to the owner's residence is consistent with the extension of the exemption to all natural persons. If an unmarried individual with no family
can exempt his or her residence, why not grant this power to an
owner with family in another residence? But why not let the owner
choose? To do so would create more uncertainty and would grant the
owner the right to choose which residence to protect from creditors
and which residence to be free to devise. This decision may depend
on the value of the homes or the owner's testamentary desires rather
than the owner's desire to protect his or her family. Thus, the second
alternative of granting the owner the power to choose appears to be
a less desirable one. Why not delegate the issue to the court? Here
the dilemma is what guidelines should the court use, and the potential
costs and uncertainties of litigation. Thus, residence by the owner
seems to be the best solution for priority. The secondary priority
should be for the family's residence, with judicial intervention required
if there is more than one family residence.
C. Impact of Surviving Spouse's Abandonment or Waiver
If the owner of a homestead is survived by a spouse, then the
surviving spouse generally will receive at least a life estate in the
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homestead and in some cases, the entire fee. Further, if the spouse
receives a life estate, then the owner does not have the right to devise44
the remainder interest. 42 A spouse, however, may waive,4 disclaim,

or lose 45 his or her right to receive an interest in the homestead on
the owner's death. Further, under prior law, the nonowner spouse
could lose his or her right to the homestead by abandoning his or her
spouse during lifetime and instituting steps to obtain a divorce.46
Whether a spouse can lose his or her right to homestead by abandoning
the home and the owner-spouse under current law is an issue that
has been certified to the Florida Supreme Court in the case of In re
Scholtz. 4 7 Oral arguments have been heard, although no decision has

been rendered through January, 1989.
1. Abandonment
The concept of abandonment by the nonowner spouse was enunciated in 1945 in Barlow v. Barlow,48 when the head of the family
requirement was in existence. In Barlow, the wife left her husband
and home and procured counsel to obtain a divorce; although, they
were not divorced when the husband died. At the husband's death,
he no longer was the head of a family because his wife had abandoned
him. The legal status of marriage was insufficient to create a family
unit of which the husband was the head. Thus, there was no homestead
in which the surviving spouse would receive an interest. Had there

42. If the spouse receives the entire fee, he or she received it by devise or by descent. If
received by devise, there were no minor children; if received by descent, there were no lineal
descendants. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; FLA. STAT. §§ 732.103, .401 (1987).
43. This may occur by antenuptial agreement, whether entered into before or during the
marriage. FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1987); see Trapani v. Gagliardi, 502 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1987) (homestead rights may be waived by antenuptial agreement); Estate of Garcia v.
Garcia, 399 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (valid waiver was made of all rights, including
homestead rights); Johnson v. Johnson, 140 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962) (surviving spouse
waived all rights to homestead in valid antenuptial agreement except for right to use and occupy
homestead so long as she did not remarry).
By contrast, a lineal descendant could not waive the right to homestead by a quitclaim deed
executed prior to the death of the parent-owner of the homestead. Van Pelt v. Estate of Clarke,
476 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985).
44. FLA.STAT. § 732.801 (1987).
45. Id. § 732.802. This statute applies to one who '"mlawfully and intentionally kills or
participates in procuring the death of the decedent." Id. § 732.802(1). See supra note 25.
An additional issue is whether a spouse's joinder is required for inter vivos alienation if the
spouse has waived all of his or her rights to the homestead.
46. Barlow v. Barlow, 23 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1945).
47. 525 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1988).
48. 156 Fla. 458, 23 So. 2d 723 (1945).
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been minor children who remained with the husband, then the husband
would have been the head of a family; but, it is unclear from the
supreme court's decision whether the surviving spouse would have
been entitled to a life estate in the homestead.
Under the current constitution, the concept of abandonment by a
nonowner surviving spouse should be irrelevant for the homestead
exemption or devise issues. 49 This is because the owner no longer is
required to be head of a family 0 If the owner resides on the property,
then the property will be the owner's homestead. Thus, it is irrelevant
whether the nonowner spouse resides there or has abandoned the
owner-spouse. Further, the devise issue will depend on whether the
owner is survived by a spouse or minor child. Whether the owner is
survived by a spouse should depend on the objective facts of survivorship 5' and the existence of a legal, undissolved marriage. The subjective issue of whether the surviving spouse was a good, resident spouse
who has not engaged in any acts of adultery, or whether the deceased
spouse had contemplated or instituted divorce proceedings, or whether
the survivor had abandoned the owner-spouse and home with no intent
to return and was procuring a divorce should be irrelevant.62 In this
way, a spouse could give up the right to homestead by agreement,
disclaimer, murder, or divorce but not by having separated from or
abandoned the owner-spouse. The same rules should apply in determining whether the restrictions on alienation apply to an owner if the
owner is married.
If, on the other hand, the owner has "abandoned" his or her spouse
and home, leaving the surviving spouse residing on the property at
the owner's death, then the issue should be one of residency. In other
words, does the owner's family reside on the property? If the owner
did not own and reside in another home in Florida, then based on

49. These two issues, one arising under FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) and the other under
§ 4(c), should be construed consistently, especially with respect to the terms "owner" and
"homestead." See Holden v. Gardner, 420 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982).
50. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
51. If both spouses appear to die simultaneously, then resort to Florida's simultaneous
death statute may be necessary. FLA. STAT. § 732.601 (1987).
52. The same rule should apply to determine whether an owner is subject to the restriction
on alienation, i.e., is the owner married, not whether the owner has been abandoned by his or
her spouse. Alienation of a homestead by sale or gift by a married person who has been
abandoned by his or her spouse can be accomplished without spousal joinder - the owner and
remaining family merely need to permanently abandon the residence, and homestead status will

terminate. A transfer of a portion of an interest or a mortgage is more complicated - a divorce
may be necessary if the other spouse is unavailable or unwilling to consent.
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prior case law- the courts should be sympathetic toward the surviving
spouse and find the residency requirement satisfied. If, however, the
decedent owned two homes in Florida, the first one being the one he
or she had abandoned and the second one being the one in which he
or she resided at death, then the resolution of the issues will be more
complicated and will depend in part on the issue discussed previously
4
of whether an owner can have more than one homestead.
If the Florida Supreme Court disagrees with the above reasoning
and finds the concept of abandonment to have continued viability, then
it should be limited to facts similar to Barlow. Thus, the concept
would apply only when the surviving spouse has abandoned the owner
and homestead and has taken steps to procure a divorce. Otherwise,
to expand the applicability of spousal abandonment to homestead issues
will open the door to post-mortem inquiries regarding the quality of
the marriage and the prospects of divorce.
The foregoing discussion of abandonment should not be confused
with the traditional context in which abandonment of the homestead
arises. If, for example, the residency requirement has been satisfied
and the owner or family who resides on the property then leaves the
home, the issue is whether the homestead has been permanently abandoned or whether the absence is temporary and there is an intent to
return. 5 In this context, the issue of abandonment still is a relevant
one.
2. Waiver, Disclaimer, or Murder
If the spouse waives, disclaims, or otherwise loses the right to the
homestead and the owner is not survived by a minor child, then a
collateral issue is whether the owner has a surviving spouse for pur-

53. M.O. Logue Sod Serv. v. Logue, 422 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (husband disappeared, leaving wife and minor child residing at home, which maintained its homestead exemption
from husband's debts; husband and wife were then divorced with wife receiving ownership of
the home, free from husband's debts); Burdick v. Burdick, 399 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981)
(husband was considered head of a family even though he left home and resided in apartment
with friends, and then died while in the hospital, but continued to support wife who resided in
house); see also O'Neal v. Miller, 196 So. 478 (Fla. 1940) (homestead status continued even
though wife and minor daughter left homestead because of husband's cruelty).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
55. E.g., Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So. 2d 443 (1942) (rental of home during tourist
season did not constitute an abandonment of the homestead because there was intent to return);
Dean v. Heimbach, 409 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (homestead status continued, notwithstanding that father was temporarily required to remove himself from the county of his
residence as a condition of his bail, because owner intended to return to homestead).
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poses of the constitutional restriction against devise. In other words,
is the owner prohibited from devising so that the homestead will
descend by statute as if the spouse did not survive? Or will the owner
be treated as if he or she were not survived by a spouse and thus be
able to devise the property if not survived by a minor child?6 For
example, if the decedent has two adult children from a first marriage
and his or her spouse has waived all rights to the homestead including
the statutory life estate, could the decedent devise the home to one
of the two children or to a friend or must the property descend by
statute to both children (the spouse's statutory life estate having been
waived by agreement)? Or if the decedent has no lineal descendants,
could the decedent devise the homestead to a friend or a relative, or
must it descend to the decedent's heirs at law under the intestacy
rules?
The answer to these questions depends on whether the legislature
can define the term "surviving spouse," as used in the constitution,
to have a meaning other than its usual meaning. Certainly, the legislature has the power to proscribe the requirements for a valid marriage
and thus determine who qualifies as spouse. Further, the legislature
has the power to determine who is a surviving spouse when the two
spouses appear to die simultaneously 7 But can or should the legislature define the term to mean one who survives the decedent as his
or her spouse but only if the spouse also receives an interest in the
property?
Nowhere does the constitution provide that a surviving spouse
must receive an interest in the homestead. The constitution merely
prohibits devise if the decedent is survived by a spouse. 5 The legislature has filled that gap by providing who will receive the homestead
if the decedent is prohibited from devising it or fails to do so properly. 9
The statutes provide that the surviving spouse will receive the homestead if there are no lineal descendants; otherwise, the spouse will
receive a life estate. Thus, the legislature has implemented statutes
consistent with the underlying purpose of the prohibition against devise, which is to protect the decedent's spouse or minor children.

56. In the case of a disclaimer or murder, the statutes generally provide that the property
passes as if the spouse had predeceased the owner-spouse. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.801(3)(a), .802(1),
.802(3) (1987). This could mean that the property passes by statute as if the decedent had no
surviving spouse, i.e., by intestacy; or it could mean that the decedent can devise the homestead
if he or she is treated as not having a surviving spouse.
57. Id. § 732.601.
58. The exception is that devise is permitted to the spouse if there is no minor child.
59. FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (1983).
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The best alternative would be for the constitution and statutes to
be interpreted so that the decedent is prohibited from devising his or
her homestead if survived by a spouse, whether or not the spouse
accepts or is allowed to receive a fee or life estate in the homestead.
The second best alternative would be to allow the owner to devise
the homestead if the surviving spouse has given up his or her right
to receive the homestead, but only if the decedent is not survived by
lineal descendants. In this way a married person, with no lineal descendants, could decide whether to devise the homestead or allow it to
pass to his or her intestate heirs, if the spouse gives up his or her
right. The surviving spouse, however, should not have the power to
decide whether a lineal descendant will receive an interest in the
homestead by waiving or disclaiming his or her homestead rights.
Thus, if the owner is survived by a spouse who waives, disclaims, or
loses his or her right to homestead, then the owner's lineal descendants
should receive the homestead.
D.

Inurement of Exemption

The constitution provides that on the owner's death, the exemption
from the owner's debts inures to the owner's surviving spouse and
heirs.6° During 1987 and 1988, a controversy arose as to who qualified
as an heir for purpbses of the inurement of the exemption and whether
an adult child who had not been dependent on the decedent could
claim the decedent's homestead as exempt from the decedent's creditors.

1

In June, 1988, the Florida Supreme Court settled this contro-

versy by ruling that the term "heirs" refers to "those persons entitled
to the decedent's property under the statute of intestate succession."6
Thus, the term "heirs" would include the decedent's lineal descendants
whether or not they were dependents during his or her lifetime.

60.
61.

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b).
In re Estate of Taylor, 516 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987) (held that the deceased

mother's property was not exempt from her creditors where she was survived by four adult
children who did not reside with her); Lopez v. Public Health Trust, 509 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 3d

D.C.A. 1987) (granted personal representative's petition to set aside property as homestead
where property passed to decedent's three adult children, none of whom was dependent on her
at her death); State Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Trammell, 508 So. 2d 422 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1987) (construed "heirs" to mean those persons who would be intestate heirs, thus
excluding the decedent's "good friend").
62. Public Health Trust v. Lopez, (In re Estate of Taylor), 531 So. 2d 946, 951 n.6 (Fla.
1988) citing FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1985), approving Lopez v. Public Health Trust, 509 So.
2d 1286 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987), disapproving In re Estate of Taylor, 516 So. 2d 322 (Fla.2d
D.C.A. 1987).
63. Lopez, 531 So. 2d at 946; see also FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1987).
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Further, the term can include more distant relatives, such as parents,
siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, and even relatives of a spouse
who predeceased the decedent.6
If the homestead passes by statute, then the exemption will inure
to the benefit of the new owners of the homestead (the surviving
spouse, lineal descendants, or other heirs). If, however, the homestead
passes by devise, then the exemption will inure to the benefit of a
new owner only if that new owner is the decedent's surviving spouse,
a lineal descendant, or another person who would be an heir had the
decedent died intestate.
Thus, ownership and residency by the owner or his or her family
are relevant for determining whether the owner is entitled to the
homestead exemption. And if homestead status exists, then marital
status is relevant to determine whether the restriction on alienation
is present. Further, on death, ownership, residency, and existence of
a surviving spouse or minor child are relevant with respect to devise
and descent. In addition, who receives the property, such as the surviving spouse or heirs, is relevant to determine whether the exemption
from the decedent's debts inures to the benefit of the new owners.
III.

IMPACT OF VARIous FORMS OF OWNERSHIP

The changing nature of family life and its fragmentation, due to
separations, divorces, second and third marriages, children from different marriages, and antenuptial agreements all can add variables to
the homestead issues. These situations, among others, result in numerous forms of ownership that challenge the applicability of the homestead laws and the underlying purpose of these laws.
Homestead offers a special type of protection to the family - it
protects the owner and family from creditors. Homestead also restricts
the owner's right to alienate or devise the property under certain
circumstances. When the homestead is owned by one individual, the
major issues, even though complex, are limited to the availability of
the exemption and its inurement, the restriction on inter vivos alienation, and the devise and descent rules. Ownership as tenants by the
entirety adds some subtle, but not serious, differences to the issues.
Ownership as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants
in common, or with a life estate in one person and the remainder
interests in others, significantly complicates and compounds the homestead issues.

64.

FLA. STAT. § 731.103 (1987).
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A.

Tenancy by the Entirety

When the homestead is owned by a married couple as tenants by
the entirety, the homestead issues are blended with tenancy by the
entirety issues, but they still are manageable. In this context, the
homestead exemption will be available to both spouses if either or
both reside there or their family resides there.Y A lien will not attach
to a homestead held by the entirety unless it is both the type of lien
that can attach to property, notwithstanding its homestead status,
such as tax liens or liens for homestead improvements, and also a
joint liability of both spouses.6 Further, the homestead restriction on
inter vivos alienation is complemented by tenancy by the entirety
status so that the homestead held by the entireties cannot be alienated
without joinder of both spouses. Such a homestead cannot be partitioned or severed without spousal consent or divorce. Also, a homestead owned by the entirety is not subject to devise because of the
nature of tenancy by the entirety ownership itself (rather than its
homestead status).6 For this reason, the statutory descent rules for
homesteads are not applicable to a homestead held by the entirety.6
B.

Other Forms of Co-ownership

When more than one person owns an interest in a home, other
than by tenancy by the entirety, the homestead issues become more
complex to analyze. Co-ownership may arise in many contexts. First,
former spouses may own the property as tenants in common as a
result of a divorce that severed a tenancy by the entirety. Second,
the property may be owned as tenants in common by relatives or
friends for personal reasons. Third, the homestead property may be
owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as a retained life
estate, with the remainder having been gifted away, so as to avoid
the prohibition against devise. Or fourth, by statutory proscription,
the surviving spouse may own a life estate, with the decedent's lineal
descendants owning vested remainder interests. These, of course, are
not the exclusive forms of, or reasons for, split ownership or co-ownership.
65. Moxley v. Wickes Corp., 356 So. 2d 785, 785 n.1 (Fla. 1978). It also should apply if
only one spouse's family lives there.
66. Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920). But see Maines &
Maines, OurLegal ChameleonRevisited: Florid'sHomesteadExemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REV.
227, 251 (1978) (discussing some exceptions to this rule).
67. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950); Menendez v. Rodriquez, 106 Fla. 214,
143 So. 223 (1932); see also Moxley, 356 So. 2d at 785 n.1.
68. See FLA. STAT. § 732.401(2) (1987).
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When there are several interests, each owner's interest must be
analyzed to see if it qualifies as homestead and thus is exempt from
creditors. After this determination is made, if there are homestead
and nonhomestead interests, then other issues surface. One issue is
whether one owner, or a creditor of an owner of a nonhomestead
interest, can require the partition or sale of the property, including
the homestead interest. A second issue involves whether the constitutional prohibition against devise and the statutory rules for descent
of the homestead interest apply to the homestead interest and the
form of ownership involved. These issues will be considered first with
respect to a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or a tenancy in
common and then with respect to life estates and remainder interests.
1. Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship and Tenancy in Common
With respect to a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or a
tenancy in common, each tenant's interest can qualify for the homestead exemption if that tenant or his or her family resides there. If
only one tenant resides on the property, then the issue is whether
the family of the nonresident tenant resides there, thus qualifying it
as the nonresident tenant's homestead. 69 For example, if former
spouses own the homestead property as tenants in common pursuant
to a divorce and one former spouse resides there with a child of both
owners, will only the resident tenant's interest qualify as homestead
or will both tenants' interests qualify as homestead? Both interests
should be able to qualify, assuming that the nonresident spouse does
not own and reside in another Florida home. 70 If the nonresident
spouse owns another Florida residence, then the issue discussed pre-

69.

See supra text accompanying notes 27-36 (discussing the residency requirement and

the definition of family).
70.

Barnett Bank v. Osbourne, 349 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th D.G.A. 1977) (affirmed trial court's

holding that divorced mother with exclusive possession of the homestead was-head of a family,
and that the entire property, even though it was owned by the former spouses as tenants in
common, was protected by the homestead exemption); Daniels v. Katz, 237 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1970) (where former wife and children resided on property owned by former spouses
as tenants in common after divorce, court without discussion, held that both undivided one-half
interests in residence owned by the former spouses qualified as homestead); see Nationwide
Fin. Corp. v. Thompson, 400 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (when husband and wife separated
and husband moved into apartment, residency by family, i.e., wife and minor child, satisfied
homestead residency requirement with respect to husband's undivided one-half interest); see
also Sabin v. Butter, 522 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1988) (mortgage on homestead owned by
former husband, who along with the children had exclusive right to possession, required consent
of co-owner, his former wife).
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viously of whether an owner can have more than one homestead must
be resolved before deciding whether the nonresident's interest in the
71
tenancy qualifies as his or her homestead.
A cotenant generally has the right to partition and force a sale of
cotenancy property, even if the property is homestead.7 Thus, the
fact that one tenant's interest qualifies for the homestead exemption
generally will not prevent another tenant from forcing a sale of the
property to effect a partition.7 This is not true, however, if one tenant
has exclusive possession of the property and that tenant does not
consent to partition the property. In that case, the right of exclusive
possession overrides any other cotenant's general right to partition."
Further, even if a cotenant does not want to force a partition, a
partition may result if that cotenant has a judgment creditor and that
cotenant's interest does not qualify for the homestead exemption. For
example, if a creditor forces the sale of a cotenant's nonhomestead
interest, then the purchaser of that interest could force a partition
and sale of the property, unless the other cotenant has the right to
exclusive possession.
Each cotenant has the right of inter vivos alienation absent an
agreement among the tenants to the contrary. If, however, a married
cotenant's interest qualifies as homestead, then that cotenant's interest
cannot be alienated without the joinder of that cotenant's spouse. 75
With respect to the right to devise, at least one case has held that
ownership of a homestead interest as a joint tenant with right of
survivorship is not subject to the constitutional prohibition against
devise if there is a surviving spouse or minor child. 76 By contrast, a

71.
72.

See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 1978) ("We hold ...

that our constitutional

provisions allow the partition and forced sale of homestead property upon suit by one of the
owners of that property, if such partition and forced sale is necessary to protect the beneficial

enjoyment of the owners in common to the extent of their interest in the property" and "[t]he
court should make reasonable efforts to preserve the homestead interest if the property is
divisible.").
73. Id.
74. Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976), modifled, Tullis v. Tullis, 360
So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1978); see supra note 67.

75. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
76. Ostyn v. Olympic, 455 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984). In Ostyn, the property
was conveyed by decedent while he was single, to himself and his sister, his brother-in-law and
his sister's niece, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The court held that decedent's
surviving spouse had no interest in the homestead property because on his death, "there was
no property interest then owned by him to which a homestead interest could attach for the
benefit of the defendant [his wifel." Id.
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homestead interest owned as a tenant in common would be subject to
the constitutional prohibition against devise if there is a surviving
spouse or minor child. 77 Thus, the protection accorded a person who
is the sole owner of a homestead and the protection accorded that
person's family is not necessarily available to a cotenant and his or
her family.
2. Life Estates and Remainder Interests
If a surviving spouse or another person owns a life estate in a
home, then that interest can qualify for the homestead exemption if
the life tenant or his or her family resides there. 78 If this residency
requirement is met, then a creditor of the life tenant generally cannot
force a sale of the life estate. 79 By contrast, the remainder interest
cannot qualify for the homestead exemption until the interest becomes
possessory.8 This would be true even if the remainderperson resides
there with the life tenant, because the remainderperson is residing
on the life estate, not the remainder interest.81 Thus, a creditor of a
remainderperson could obtain a judgment that would be a lien against
the remainderperson's interest and that interest could be subject to
a forced sale. Even if this were to occur, would not the life tenant
be protected because he or she has the right to possess the property?
Clearly, the life tenant would be protected from eviction, but the life
tenant's right to possession would not assure the life tenant peaceful
possession when a stranger owns a remainder interest. For example,
a decision by the life tenant to replace the roof or to sell the property
would involve the remainderpersons. Further, the remainderpersons

But see Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914) (revocable trust constituted an invalid
testamentary devise of homestead); In re Estate of Johnson, 397 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1981) (court held that the decedent's equitable interest in his homestead, which was held by a
revocable trust during his lifetime, was not subject to devise nor could it pass under the terms
of the revocable trust, which was an invalid testamentary disposition).
77. Query whether a cotenant who cannot devise a homestead interest could enter into a
buy/sell agreement, which would obligate the recipient of the homestead property at the cotenant's death to sell the property to another cotenant.
78. Smith v. Unkefer, 515 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987).
79. The exceptions would be for liens such as tax liens and liens for homestead improvements. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; see also supra note 7 (homestead may be subject to forfeiture
under the RICO statute).
80. Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969); Anemaet v. Martin-Senour Co.,
114 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1959); Comment, Homestead Exemption: What Protectionfor
the Widow and Heirs?, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 321 (1969).
81. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d at 727; Anemaet, 114 So. 2d at 23; Comment, supra note 80.
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could request the right to inspect periodically and could subject the
lifetime interest to claims for waste or damage to the remainder interest.
With respect to inter vivos alienation, a life tenant would have the
right to alienate his or her life estate. Thus, the life tenant could give
his or her life estate to a child; however, the child's interest would
terminate at the death of the life tenant. If the life estate qualifies
as homestead, and the life tenant is married, then spousal joinder
would be a prerequisite for inter vivos alienation. The life estate would
end, of course, when the life tenant dies. Thus, there is no right to
devise the life estate. Accordingly, the prohibition against devise of
a homestead is irrelevant when the homestead is only a life estate.
With respect to the right to alienate or devise the remainder interest,
the constitutional restrictions will not apply to the remainder interests
during the life tenant's life, because the remainder interests cannot
qualify as homestead until they become possessory. How then can a
cotenant protect himself or herself from the other cotenants? One way
is to consider another form of ownership. If this is not desired, then
another solution is to allow only resident cotenants and to have a
cotenancy agreement. Such an agreement could prohibit partition,
determine rights of possession and obligations for expenses and other
items, govern each tenant's right to alienate or devise the property
(subject to any constitutional restrictions or prohibitions), and provide
procedures to resolve disputes as well as buy-out provisions.
C.

Choosing the Best Form of Ownership

What is the most desirable form of ownership of the homestead?
This depends on what protections one wants, what restrictions one
will accept, and who one wants to succeed to the property. In some
cases, the most desirable form will be the simplest, least complicated
form; and this depends on one's marital status and whether there are any
minor children.
For an unmarried individual, the simplest form of ownership is fee
simple ownership by that one person. For married individuals with
minor children, the simplest form of ownership is a tenancy by the
entirety. For married individuals with no minor children, they may
choose either fee simple ownership by one spouse or co-ownership as
tenants by the entirety.
Complications can arise when a married individual owns the homestead alone, if there are any minor children. This is because on the
owner's death, the surviving spouse will receive a life estate and the
lineal descendants, who may or may not be related to the surviving
spouse, will receive vested remainder interests. These complications
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can arise when decisions must be made regarding the property and
its maintenancem or regarding sale of the property by the surviving
spouse and the lineal descendants. This type of complication can be
avoided while either spouse is alive by ownership as tenants by the
entirety; however, if the surviving spouse has minor children, then
the prohibition against devise will apply on the death of the survivor,
and the minor and adult lineal descendants of the survivor will own
the property as tenants in common. Further, if both spouses have
children from prior marriages, then a tenancy by the entirety may
deprive one set of children of a remainder interest in the homestead
and grant the other set of children an interest they would not have
had if only one spouse had owned the homestead.
Complications also can arise when tenants by the entirety divorce,
if ownership of the property is converted to a tenancy in common.
Although tenancy in common may be the best economic or emotional
decision pursuant to a divorce, sole ownership by one party will provide
more protection for at least one spouse and his or her family. Further,
even if the cotenant does not have creditors, the problem of succession
of the property raises complications. For example, if a divorce results
in a tenancy in common and the resident owner remarries and dies
survived by a spouse, then the surviving spouse could own all of the
decedent's one-half interest or could receive a life estate, with the
lineal descendants from one or both marriages owning the remainder
interest in that half. 3 The other half would be owned by the decedent's
former spouse. Thus, this form of ownership could involve the issues
applicable to life estate/remainder interests discussed previously.
Further, this form of ownership may involve tenancy in common issues
previously discussed, complicated by the fact that the surviving spouse
and the former spouse are co-owners.

82. See Chapman v. Chapman, 526 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988) (discussion of the
liability of the life tenant to the remainderpersons for failure to pay real property taxes).
83. See In re Estate of Melisi, 440 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (decedent's one-half
interest was devised to his surviving spouse, and the other one-half was owned by decedent's
former spouse, who had exclusive possession and lived there with their minor child); In re
Estate of Schorr, 409 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) (decedent's interest as tenant in common
in homestead passed with a life estate to his wife, from whom he was never legally divorced,
with a vested remainder to his son, with the other one-half owned by another woman with
whom the decedent lived); Bendl v. Bendl, 246 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971) (property was
owned one-half by decedent's surviving spouse and one-half by decedent's former spouse, who
sought partition of the property).
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY REFORM

One area ripe for reform involves the constitutional prohibition
against devise and the statutory rules for descent when the decedent
is survived by a spouse and a minor child. In such a case, the surviving
spouse will receive a life estate and the minor, along with other lineal
descendants, will receive a vested remainder interest. The homestead
life estate seems antiquated and rooted in the concept of dower, which
has been abolished. Further, owning only a life estate can create
problems for the surviving spouse and yet the remainder interest
does not necessarily provide the minor child with a residence during
minority. Thus, either the constitutional prohibition needs to be reformed or the statutory descent rules need to be revised to better
protect the surviving spouse or minor, when needed.
If the surviving spouse is the parent of the minor child, then it is
assumed that the surviving parent will provide for the child and make
sure he or she has a residence. If not, the laws regarding the surviving
parent's obligation to support a minor will protect that minor child;
whereas, a remainder interest in the homestead will not. If the surviving spouse is not the minor's parent but the minor resided in the
homestead at the owner's death, then the surviving spouse will continue to live with and provide for the minor child only if the survivor
is appointed that child's guardian. In that case, the minor will be
protected by the guardianship laws rather than the remainder interest
in the homestead. If the surviving spouse is not the minor child's
parent and the minor did not live with the deceased parent, then the
child does not need an interest in the homestead and the child's remainder interest can adversely affect the surviving spouse's right to use
and enjoy the homestead in the same way the spouse could if the
spouse owned the entire fee. Thus, the statutory life estate and vested
remainders hinder the spouse but do not necessarily protect the minor
child.
Because it is difficult to protect the minor child by the homestead
descent rules and because the life estate does not fully protect the
surviving spouse, a solution would be to allow the married owner to
devise the homestead to his or her spouse, whether or not survived
by a minor child. This solution would need to be implemented by
constitutional amendment.8 Protection for the minor child would be
provided under the parent-child laws.

84.
85.

See supra text accompanying note 82.
Until then, the way to avoid the prohibition is ownership as a tenancy by the entirety.
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Another area involves whether a homestead owner should be prohibited from devising the homestead if survived by a minor child but
not a spouse. Under the current laws, the minor child would receive
the homestead as a tenant in common with the deceased parent's other
lineal descendants (who may be half-brothers, sisters, nieces, or
nephews). The minor would not be guaranteed exclusive possession
of the homestead; however, if there were a dispute as to possession,
the property could be partitioned and sold. The minor then would
have his or her share of the proceeds to purchase or rent a new
residence. Under such facts, the argument would be that constitutional
reform is not necessary and that the statutory provisions are adequate.
One could foresee an even more complicated statutory provision granting the minor or minors exclusive possession during their minority;
however, it is hoped that the homestead laws will not be further
complicated by this type of provision.
Under different facts, however, the current prohibition against
devise, when there is a minor but no surviving spouse, does not seem
warranted. For example, assume that the deceased owner did not
have custody of the minor child and that the minor did not live with
the owner or use that homestead as his or her residence. In such a
case, why should the owner be prohibited from devising the homestead
away from that minor? Does the constitution need to protect the
nonresident minor child or should the divorce decree have contemplated the shelter and support of the minor after the death of the
noncustodial parent? Under such an argument, the constitution should
be amended so that the prohibition against devise applies if the decedent is not survived by a spouse only if the decedent is survived by
a minor child who resided on the homestead at the owner's death (or
was temporarily absent from it).
If the statutory descent provisions are not amended, an additional
problem arises when the surviving spouse receives a life estate and
a descendant resides in the homestead but only owns a remainder
interest. In essence, the descendant is residing on the surviving
spouse's life estate rather than on his or her remainder interest.
Nevertheless, such descendant should be allowed to claim the homestead exemption for his or her remainder interest. To do this, the
constitution would need to be amended (or the current case law reversed).
Another area for consideration is whether the decedent should
have the right to devise his or her homestead if there is a surviving
spouse who has waived, disclaimed, or lost Ithe right to receive an
interest in the homestead. Under such circumstances, the constitution
should be amended to allow devise. Alternatively, the legislature could
define the constitutional reference to a surviving spouse to exclude
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one who waives, disclaims, or otherwise loses his or her right to
receive an interest in the homestead;" however, such legislation would
be subject to constitutional challenge.
Another area for revision would be to resolve whether a person
can have more than one homestead exemption. If a person could have
more than one homestead, then the revision might include a definition
of family for purposes of satisfying the residency requirement for the
exemption. Further, consideration would need to be given to whether
the constitutional prohibition against devise should apply differently
to each exempt homestead. For example, if the owner and his or her
spouse resided in one homestead, perhaps that homestead should pass
to that surviving spouse by devise or statute. If, however, the owner's
other homestead were the home of his or her minor children, then
that homestead should pass to the minor children, or possibly to all
of the owner's descendants, but not to the surviving spouse.
V.

CONCLUSION

Florida's homestead exemption and restrictions have remained constant for many years in most ways. The 1984 elimination of the family
headship requirement effected a major change. This change extends
the exemption privilege so that any natural person can exempt his or
her residence (or in some cases, a family's residence) from his or her
creditors. By extending the exemption to all natural persons, it also
extends protection to certain family members of that owner. Now a
married owner of a home is subject to the restrictions on inter vivos
alienation and devise, whether or not the owner is the head of a
family, if the owner or his or her family resides there.
The elimination of the family headship requirement necessitates
that concepts applicable before the amendment be re-evaluated. These
include the concepts of spousal abandonment and the residency requirement. Further, the amendment brings to the foreground the issue of
whether one person can own more than one homestead.
In conclusion, under the current constitution, the owner of a homestead should be prohibited from devising his or her homestead if survived by a spouse (except for a devise to that spouse if there is no
minor child), and the doctrine of spousal abandonment should not apply
to determine whether there is a surviving spouse. Thus, the prohibition

86. Currently, the Florida disclaimer and murder statutes would treat that spouse as if he
or she failed to survive. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.801, .803 (1987). The question is whether these
statutes apply to the constitutional prohibition against devise when the decedent was in fact
survived by a spouse. For a further discussion see also supm text accompanying notes 56-58.
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against devise should apply even if the surviving spouse did not reside
with the owner or a divorce was pending at the time of the owner's
death, and even if the survivor has waived, disclaimed, or lost all
rights to the homestead. Similarly, the owner should be prohibited
from devising the homestead if survived by a minor child, whether
or not the owner had manifested substantial concern for the welfare
of the child. Second, the surviving spouse should receive the statutory
life estate or entire fee (depending on whether there are lineal descendants) unless the survivor has waived, disclaimed, or lost that interest
in the homestead. Third, a person should be limited to one homestead,
his or her own residence, but if that person does not own a qualifying
residence (i.e., the owner rents, owns a cooperative, or owns a residence located outside of Florida), then the owner's family's residence
should qualify as the owner's homestead. This limitation should apply
for all purposes - exemption, devise, and descent. Fourth, for purposes of the residency requirement, the owner's family should include
all relatives listed in the intestacy statute including lineal descendants,
ascendants and collaterals, and could also include nonrelatives in some
circumstances. For example, a former spouse supported by the owner
might qualify as family, within a revised family in fact definition.
Further, providing a residence for the family member should be considered sufficient support to warrant constitutional protection from
creditors and restrictions against devise.
In determining the proper form of ownership for a homestead, one
needs to consider the availability of the exemption, one's desire and
ability to control the homestead during lifetime, and any restriction
on inter vivos alienation, all as they relate to various possible forms
of ownership. In addition, one needs to consider marital status, age
of any children, testamentary desires, and any restrictions on devise
and statutory provisions for descent. Then, an informed decision can
be made as to the best form of ownership under the circumstances.
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